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This paper investigates the impact of unemployment insurance (UI) generosity on
the distribution of match tenure. We show that more generous UI increases expected
tenure, reducing the mass of the lower tail of match duration and increasing the
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(M. Centeno).1 Introduction
The impact of the unemployment insurance (UI) system generosity on diﬀerent labor
market outcomes, such as the duration of unemployment spells, has drawn the attention
of a large number of researchers in labor economics. More recently, it has been recognized
that UI might also be associated with an overall increase in match quality (Acemoglu and
Shimer, 2000). The UI system might encourage risk averse workers to take on more risk,
since without UI they would avoid the risk of unemployment by taking low productivity
jobs that are easier to obtain, forgoing better job/matches.
Match quality is diﬃcult to quantify empirically. In this paper, we rely heavily on
theory to identify job tenure with match quality. The idea of representing a good match
by a lengthy duration comes from Jovanovic (1979), where a match is a pure experience
good: the quality of a match is not known ex ante, but must be experienced. Under the
assumption that “good matches endure,” we argue that looking at match duration, while
conditioning on the wage, implies that the focus of the paper is on the other aspects of
match quality that combine to impact on mobility.
We test the impact of UI generosity on match quality and argue that UI has a positive
impact on the expected quality of job matches (proxied by job tenure), exerting a change
in the location and scale parameters of the match quality distribution. This implies that
more generous UI increases the expected tenure, and that the UI impact is greater at
higher tenure quantiles, thus increasing the variance of the tenure distribution.
Previous empirical research on the UI impact on subsequent job duration includes Belzil
(2001) and Centeno (2004). Belzil, exploring the change in the initial entitlement period
rule implemented in Canada in 1977, focuses on UI duration and ﬁnds a weak positive
impact of the maximum beneﬁt duration on subsequent job duration. Centeno focuses on
the impact of the UI amount, the other dimension of generosity, in a proportional hazard
model of job duration, ﬁnding a positive impact of UI on expected match duration and a
dampening eﬀect on its cyclical behavior.
12 Data
The data is taken from the male subsample of the NLSY79 dataset, covering the 1979-1998
period. The NLSY79 panel was transformed so that each observation corresponds to an
employment spell. For each individual several observations were created. In the NLSY79
this is feasible using the variable in the Workhistory database that links jobs over years.1
For each observation, we collected worker and match-speciﬁc information and merged it
with a measure of UI generosity.
We use diﬀerences in UI beneﬁt systems across the U.S. states and over time within
states as a proxy for changes in the opportunity cost of being unemployed, computing a
state-level simulated UI beneﬁt. We follow previous work by Levine (1993). For each pair
(worker i, state j), we computed the beneﬁt that worker i would receive if she were to be
unemployed in state j. The simulated beneﬁt for each state/year pair is the average beneﬁt
that the individuals in the sample would receive in each state and year. This simulated
beneﬁt allows us to use individual variation in how each state’s UI system structure applies
and at the same time avoids the simultaneity problems associated with using the actual
beneﬁts received.
We included observations with tenure greater than two weeks and for individuals 16
years or older and not enrolled in school. Given that the variable of interest is job tenure in
matches preceding unemployment spells, we included only employment spells that follow
an unemployment experience in which the individual was eligible to receive some kind of
UI, leaving 2,994 observations for 2,066 individuals. In the ﬁnal sample, we included only
one observation per individual (randomly selected) to avoid the problems associated with
non-observed individual heterogeneity (see Centeno, 2004, for a more complete description
of the data).
1In the empirical analysis we did not include the military subsample. Self-employment and government
job spells were also excluded from the ﬁnal sample. The latter exclusions are justiﬁed by the speciﬁcity of
the process that governs match duration for these workers (e.g., these jobs have quite diﬀerent employment
protection rules, indeed, they represent the least and the most protected jobs). Thus, by restricting our
attention to private salaried jobs, we obtain a more homogeneous and less idiosyncratic sample.
23 Econometric Methodology
We use quantile regression to analyze employment duration data. Recent applications of
quantile regression to duration models can be found in Fitzenberger (1996), Koenker and
Bilias (2001), and Machado and Portugal (2002). While most applications of duration
analysis use models speciﬁed with hazard functions, the speciﬁc questions we would like
to address in this paper are very well suited to the quantile regression setting. In fact,
quantile regression overcomes the two main limitations of mean regression-type models to
the study of duration data, namely the need to assume a parametric form for the duration
distribution, and that only the conditional mean depends on the covariates.
The linear-in-parameters quantile regression model to be estimated is as follows:
Qh(T) (τ|x) = x0β (τ), (1)
where h(T) is the transformed survival time and x is a p-dimensional vector of the covari-
ates. There are as many β vectors as the number of speciﬁed quantiles τ. This dependency
of the slope coeﬃcients of β (τ) upon the quantile τ, allows for a larger variety of het-
erogeneity in the conditional distribution of h(T) over the space of the covariates. In
particular, it allows us to test the location and scale shift hypotheses of the tenure dis-
tribution as a response to changes in UI generosity. In (1), all the coordinates of β (τ)
depend upon τ in the same way up to a location and scale shift. It is assumed that the
eﬀect is linear at each quantile, but in contrast to the mean classical regression model, it
does not assume that this eﬀect is necessarily the same across all quantiles.
The statistical inference necessary to test the location and scale shift hypotheses was
developed in Koenker and Xiao (2002). The location shift hypothesis is a pure location
change model, which corresponds to the classical homoscedastic linear regression model.
This hypothesis implies that the quantile regression slopes are constant and independent
of τ, implying only a change in the mean of the tenure distribution.
A more general case corresponds to the location-scale hypothesis in which the slopes
of the quantile regression depend upon τ. The general model may be seen as arising from




In this model, the covariates aﬀect both the location and scale of the conditional distri-
bution of yi given xi. As a consequence, there will be not only a mean change but also a
change in the variance of match tenure distribution.
4 Estimation Results
The quantile regression estimates for the log duration model are reported in Figure 1.2
Each plot illustrates one coordinate of the parameter vector β (τ), as a function of τ. We
allow τ to take on values in [0.2, 0.8], neglecting the very short and very long employment
spells. The shaded area in each plot represents a 90 percent conﬁdence band. The heuristic
interpretation of the results from Figure 1 in terms of testing the hypotheses is as follows:
in the case of a pure location change, the slope coeﬃcients β (τ) should ﬂuctuate around
a constant value, whereas in the case of a change in location and scale, they should mimic
the “intercept” coeﬃcient up to a change in location and scale.
Insert Figure 1 here
The eﬀect of log unemployment rate on tenure is clearly increasing with the quantile
and does not conform to the more restrictive location change hypothesis. The same is true
for the log simulated UI and its interaction with the unemployment rate. The starting
unemployment rate has no signiﬁcant eﬀect at shorter durations and gradually increases
its impact for larger match durations; the elasticity goes from close to zero to -0.4 at the
80th percentile.
More relevant for the purpose of this study are the results for the log simulated UI
beneﬁt, which are interacted with the education level to control for a potential selectivity
2The results were obtained using the R’s quantile regression package. The included covariates were the
log of the state monthly unemployment rate at the start of the match, the log of the simulated UI, an
interaction between these two variables, log wage at the beginning of the match and indicators for marital
status, union coverage, race, high-school and college degrees as the highest completed degree. Additionally,
the interactions of UI and schooling indicators were included to test for diﬀerences in the impact of UI along
the “quality of workers.” We use completed employment spells. The inclusion of censored observations
does not change the results from our basic quantile regression model, but the statistical inference theory
used to perform the formal tests is not valid under the type of censoring observed in our sampling process.
4eﬀect that “better” workers take on jobs that last longer not because of the UI eﬀect,
but simply because they are better matches. In the log simulated UI plot, we see that it
has no eﬀect in the shorter durations for high school dropouts (the excluded educational
level), but it has a sizeable eﬀect for longer tenure, peaking at the 60th percentile, with an
elasticity of 0.9. At the higher percentiles the elasticity decreases, reaching 0.55. Recall
that a location shift would imply that the UI beneﬁt exerts a constant percentage change
at all durations. That does not seem to be the case. Actually, under the assumption
that the marginal eﬀects do not change as the conditional variables change, our results
suggest that a 10 percent increase in the UI value for the median tenured high school
dropout would increase tenure duration by approximately 3 weeks (from 42 to 45 weeks).
For the 60th and 80th tenure quantiles, the gains would be of 5 and 6 weeks, respectively.
This result shows that a more generous UI system increases match duration and that this
impact is larger at longer matches. Figure 2 reports the total eﬀect of UI for the other
two classes of workers, reproducing ﬁrst the graph in Figure 1 pertaining to HS dropouts.
Workers who completed high school seem to beneﬁt uniformly over the entire log tenure
distribution, but at more modest rates than the HS dropouts. On the other hand, for
college graduates the UI system generosity has in general a null impact on match duration
(or even negative at the lower quantiles). A possible explanation for this pattern across
workers qualiﬁcations is that education and job search, proxied by UI as in Acemoglu and
Shimer (2000), are substitutes. Better matches come about by providing either better
education or a more generous UI system, which enables workers to look for jobs harder to
get, but also potentially better matches. In general, workers with lower levels of education
are more exposed to match termination (Bernhardt et al., 1999, present evidence using
also a NLSY male sample) and the UI system allows them to take on better matches that
end up lasting longer.
Insert Figure 2 here
Other covariates in Figure 1 have mixed results. The union coverage dummy has an
increasing coeﬃcient that is statistically signiﬁcant only at the highest quantiles, while the
white dummy coeﬃcient looks constant over the entire tenure distribution and is always
statistically non-signiﬁcant. The wage at the beginning of the job, which arguably controls
5for “all” other aspects of match quality, is considerably more interesting. It has a clear
increasing coeﬃcient, with an elasticity of about 0.25 at the bottom quantiles, reaching
0.5 at the top quantiles.
The results presented in Figure 1 seem to lend some support to the location-scale
change hypothesis of the conventional regression model. However, the location change
hypothesis seems to receive much less support from the analysis of individual graphs. We
next present a formal evaluation of these impressions.
Insert Table 1 here
Table 1 presents the results for the two test statistics proposed by Koenker and Xiao
(2002) to evaluate the location change and location-scale change hypotheses. The joint
test of the location-scale change hypothesis is clearly accepted, while the more restrictive
hypothesis of constant β coeﬃcients for τ in the [0.25, 0.75] range - the location change
hypothesis - is rejected at the 0.05 level. The analysis of the results for each of the
coordinates separately gives us an indication of which of them contributes the most to
these joint eﬀects. From Table 1 we can conclude that, regarding the location-scale change
hypothesis, none of the individual eﬀects are statistically signiﬁcant at the 0.01 level. For
the location change hypothesis, the reported eﬀect for the log simulated UI is signiﬁcant at
the 0.01 level, and at the 0.05 level its interaction with the high-school graduate dummy.
The rest of the eﬀects are non-signiﬁcant.
5 Conclusions
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the relationship between the quality of job matches
(measured by job tenure) and the UI system generosity. We ﬁnd evidence that for less
educated workers, particularly high school dropouts, the UI generosity increases the dura-
tion of job tenure upon unemployment at all quantiles. This impact is greater the longer
the match duration, which translates into a scale eﬀect of UI generosity in the tenure
distribution, increasing therefore the variance of tenure distribution.
These results can be interpreted to mean that the UI system is more than a search
subsidy, and has the eﬀect of increasing both the workers pickiness at the moment of
6taking a job and the quality of matches made available by ﬁrms. Along the lines of the
work by Acemoglu and Shimer (2000), we can interpret this result as the eﬀect of more
generous UI beneﬁts in eﬃciency gains operating through the scale eﬀect on the upper
tail of the match tenure distribution.
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8Table 1: Location Scale Shift and Location Shift Hypotheses Testing
Null Hypothesis
Variable Location-Scale Shift Location Shift
Log Starting Unemployment Rate 1.091 0.894
Log Simulated UI 1.981 3.042
Log UR × Log Simulated UI 1.138 0.915
Union dummy 0.897 0.964
Race dummy 1.212 0.984
High-School Graduate 1.076 1.005
College Graduate 1.268 1.353
Marital Status Dummy 0.569 0.943
Log Starting Wage 1.178 1.529
Log Sim. UI × College Grad. 1.310 1.594
Log Sim. UI × H. School Grad. 1.772 1.956
Joint Eﬀect 10.104 12.399
The statistics reported are computed in the quartile range [0.25,0.75] for robustness
reasons.
The critical values for the coordinatewise tests are 1.923 and 2.420 at the 0.05 and
0.01 levels, respectively; for the joint eﬀect test, they are, respectively, 10.99 and
12.48. See Koenker and Xiao (2001) for further details on the critical values.









































log Sim. Unemp. Insurance



















































































































Figure 1: Quantile regression process for log employment duration model.
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Figure 2: Log simulated UI eﬀect by education level
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